Centro de estudios mediales

La sexta sesión de la serie de conferencias “Phenomenological Transfers: Representations, Images, and Social Imaginaries” organizada por el Círculo Peruano de Fenomenología y Hermenéutica (CIphER) tendrá como tema la fenomenología de la imaginación y los medios. La participación es libre y a distancia. En esta sesión, participará como expositor un tesista doctoral del Centro de Estudios Mediales. A continuación, el programa y el enlace para acceder:

Link: https://zoom.us/j/95141664612?pwd=MGNIYk5jOGZybklZL3pUc0ZsVTFMUT09
ID: 951 4166 4612
Password: 140061

PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRANSFERS
Representations, Images, and Social Imaginaries
Virtual Conference Series

Sixth Session
May 14 (Sat) 2022

Imagination and Media Studies 17:30 – 18:05 (CEST) / 10:30 (Peru)

Azul Katz (Universidad de Buenos Aires)
Matter and Form of Imagination
“Husserl explains the constitution of perception with a hylomorphic theory, according to which consciousness apprehends and gives meaning to sensuous contents which in themselves are neutral and amorphous. However, difficulties arise when he seeks to apply the apprehension-contents scheme to other forms of intuitive consciousness in which the object is not strictly present, as when seeing an image, remembering a past event, conceiving a future possibility or simply phantasying something that does not exist. Although image-consciousness or imagination might be explained as a variant of the perceptual model, the hylomorphic scheme falls in crisis facing memory and phantasy. For the first case, Husserl develops a satisfactory answer: memory is a modification that reproduces a previous perception and not a kind of consciousness that apprehends and shapes past content. But phantasy resists the hylomorphic model of perception and imagination as well as the reproductive model of recollection since both of them encounter difficulties to account for the possibility to invent or experience something that was never previously given as such or of which it would be unlikely and even impossible to have an actual experience. Would the problem be solved if invention were based on phantasms instead of sensations? What would be the impressional origin of these phantasms? How would phantasy be related to what it reproduces? Do we not find in phantasy something more than just reproductive consciousness? Our presentation explores the possibilities that Husserl’s phenomenology offers to develop a non-psychological theory of invention and creativity and reflects on the effects such a theory could have on other domains of phenomenological research.”

18:10 – 18:45 (CEST) / 11:10 (Peru)

Rodrigo Y. Sandoval (Centro de Estudios Mediales – UAH)
Perceptive Phantasy as Make-believe?
“In recent years, some philosophers have found that Kendall Walton’s theory of ‘mimesis as make-believe’ is a helpful tool to understand and discuss Husserl’s concept of phantasy, both perceptive (perzeptive) and reproductive (reproduktive). However, this relationship might raise some doubts and might surprise some readers. Contrary to the now widely known similarity between the Husserlian theory of image-consciousness and Richard Wollheim’s conception of pictorial representations (Sonesson 1989; Alloa 2011; Brough 2012; Mion 2014, 2019; Nanay 2016, 2018), the Walton/Husserl parallel has not been sufficiently explored. This talk presents research that aims at filling the gap by comparing Husserl’s concept of ‘perceptive phantasy’ and Walton’s concept of ‘make-believe.’ In the first place, the paper focuses on implementing Walton’s make-believe concept in the context of depiction, following his thesis of pictures as “props in visual games of make-believe” (Walton 1992, 81). Second, it explores one of Husserl’s meanings of phantasy (Phantasie), phantasy as a “mode of performing” (Art des Vollzuges) (Hua 23, 575. See also Hua 23, 339), in order to define perceptive phantasies (such as the contemplation of theater performances or pictures) as ‘as-if’ experiences with an impressional basis.”

18:50 – 19:25 (CEST) / 11:50 (Peru)

Federico Fantelli (University of Palermo / University of Fribourg)
The Perceptual Nature of Pictorial Experience and Its Phenomenology
“In this paper I will critically discuss Sartre’s theory of images with two goals: providing a new phenomenological characterisation of pictorial experience and arguing for its perceptual, rather than imaginative, nature. Famously, Sartre proposed a unified theory of imagination that keeps together disparate phenomena, such as pictorial representations, imitations, schematic drawings, hypnagogic images, and mental images. All these forms of imaginative consciousness belong to the same family as they are equally able to make intuitive something absent “through a physical or psychic content that is given not as itself but in the capacity of ‘analogical representative’ of the object aimed at” (Sartre 2004). Nonetheless, pictorial experience has relevant phenomenological differences (especially from mental images) which support the claim that it is, rather, a perceptual phenomenon. First, pictures can be observed and can provide new information. Second, pictures are open, within certain limits that need to be traced, to the horizon of discovery and of surprise –while the same is not true for mental images. This analysis will simultaneously reveal two phenomenological characteristics of the pictorial space: insularity, i.e. the fact that pictures always appears in, and are enclosed by, the three-dimensional space; and perceptual closure, i.e. the fact that pictorial objects do not disclose further aspects as the viewer moves around pictures. Finally, using Sartre’s description of schematic drawings, I argue that the sensorimotor resources employed by the subject in the constitution of the pictorial space, e.g. eye movements and the relative kinaesthetic sensations, are in fact the same resources exploited by perceptual processes.”

19:30 – 20:30 (CEST) / 12:30 (Peru)

Keynote Speaker
Andreea Smaranda Aldea (Kent State University)

Imagining Reflection – Marks, Traces, and the Self